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]

KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually ]
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
]
ASSOCIATES,
]>
Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal No. 9303by-CA

]

Appellant Keith B. Romney ("Romney") respectfully submits the
following reply brief to the brief of Appellee Brent A. Ferrin
("Ferrin"):
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
-Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2) provides as follows:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
1e

-k

-k

(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which the questions were
asked.
-Utah R. Evid. 401 provides as follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
-1-

consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
-Utah R. Evid. 402 provides as follows:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute,
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts
of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
-Utah R. Evid. 403 provides as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
-Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992) provides as follows:
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in
a civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only.
THE ARGUMENT

BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER EVIDENCE
IS RELEVANT AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IS A
QUESTION OF LAW, THE CORRECT STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS A CORRECTNESS
STANDARD
The

determination

of

whether

evidence

is

relevant

and

therefore admissible involves a question of law, which means that
such determination is subject to review for correctness on appeal.
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
-2-
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testimony

- admissible

is

a

question of law, which we review under a correctness standard . •
.");

State v. Diaz, 859 P. 2d 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Whether

evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for
correctness . . . " ).
Perhaps the reason why this statement of the law lives on
despite the apparently clear language in Thurman is because of what
the

Thurman

Court

went

on to

state

in

connection

with the

"correction" of its earlier statement of the law in Ramirez.

In

Thurman, the Supreme Court further stated:
. . . the most common standards of review, clear error
for findings of fact, abuse of discretion or reasonability for
rulings requiring a balancing of factors, and correctness for
conclusions of law, can each be viewed as granting
progressively less discretion to the trial judge and placing
more responsibility on the appellate court . . . Taken
collectively, all such standards are law, and whether a trial
judge has exceeded the scope of the discretion granted to him
or her is a legal question. To the foregoing extent, then,
the statement in [footnote 3 of] Ramirez that admissibility
is always a question of law is correct. But the rest of the
statement — that such a correctness standard is to be applied
in reviewing each such ruling -- is not. Thurman, supra, at
p. 1270, n.ll.
That footnote 3 of Ramirez is still good law in the eyes of
the Utah Supreme Court, notwithstanding Thurman, is evidenced by
its recent decision in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 1993
WL 408287 (Utah 1993), where the Court cites both footnote 3 of
Ramirez and footnote 11 of Thurman in the same sentence for the
proposition that the determination of whether to grant a new trial
is a "legal decision" which

is reviewed under a correctness
-4-

standard.

Crookston at p. 1.

The key question is apparently

whether the ruling in question was "one determining the facts to
which the law will be applied [or one] applying the law to the
determined facts."

State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Utah

Ct. App., 1993).

If the disputed ruling is one involving the

application of the law to the facts, then a correctness standard
will apply.

LeVasseur at p. 1024.

And that is precisely what this case presents.

Romney

contends that the trial court incorrectly applied the law (Utah R.
Evid. 401) to the facts when it concluded that Romney! s Exhibits
57 and 58 were not relevant and therefore excluded them from
evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 401 should not normally be difficult for

a party to satisfy.

It merely requires that proffered evidence

have "any tendency" to make a key fact "more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
relevant, it is admissible.

If a document is

Utah R. Evid. 402.

Once that

relevancy determination is made, then Utah R. Evid. 403 applies
which vests the trial court with considerable discretion. However,
the underlying determination of relevance must first be made before
the trial court can even begin to exercise the discretion allowed
by Rule 403. Accordingly, that initial relevancy determination is
subject to a correctness standard of review on appeal.

-5-

There are strong policy reasons supporting that conclusion.
When a trial court makes a relevancy ruling, it is essentially
usurping the role of the jury and substituting its own judgment for
that of the jury.

By deeming proffered

evidence to be not

relevant, a trial court prevents a jury from considering the
proffered evidence at all.

The excluded evidence does not even

enter into the equation when the jury retires to deliberate.
Utah R. Evid. 402 states the fundamental rule that "[a] 11
relevant is admissible," except as limited as stated in the Rule.
So

basic,

so

fundamental,

is

this

presumption

favoring

the

admissibility of relevant evidence that relevant evidence may only
be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Evid. 403.

Utah R.

If a trial court can only exclude admittedly relevant

evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by
other factors, it stands to reason that a trial court's initial
determination of whether evidence is relevant at all is a much
narrower question, which should be reviewed far more carefully on
appeal.

Hence, the application of the correctness standard of

review for such determinations.

For all of the foregoing reasons,

-6-

Romney urges the Court to employ a correctness standard of review
in deciding this appeal.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED
ROMNEY'S EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 FROM EVIDENCE
The trial court clearly erred when it deemed Romney1s exhibits
57 & 58 to be not relevant and excluded them from evidence. In his
brief, Ferrin contends that there is no "exact definition" of
relevance.

That is incorrect.

There is an exact definition of

relevance and it is as follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401.
Ferrin concedes the definition is "broad," and indeed it is.
Proffered evidence must merely have some "tendency" to make an
important fact "more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."

Romney's exhibits 57 and 58 clearly

satisfied this test.
Ferrin contends that they did not satisfy the test because
"the documents did not deal with any issue before the trial court"
since they related to Ferrin's prior attempts to purchase Keith
Romney Associates ("KRA") from Romney, and not to the issue of
compensation.

The

documents

themselves

plainly

refute

that

assertion. Romney!s exhibit 58 contains the following key language
-7-

regarding

compensation

under

the

title

"Purchase

Option

and

Employment Agreement:"
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to the following re: Employment
Agreement of [Ferrin]:
1* Until [Ferrin] purchases KRA or is terminated/ [Romney]
agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%)
of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed business
cultivation expenses (the same method of determination used to
date). (Romney's Exhibit 58, emphasis added).
Romney!s

exhibit

57, in

Ferrin's

own

handwriting,

also

provided the following with respect to compensation:
7)

[Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If
[Romney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Romneyfs Exhibit
57, paragraph 7, emphasis added).

While each of the foregoing documents, in other sections,
contain some information not relevant to the case, such as what was
to become of KRA furniture and so on, each of them obviously do
contain provisions crucially important and relevant to Romney's
defense of Ferrin!s action, which was for unpaid compensation
pursuant to an "oral agreement" that Ferrin supposedly had with
Romney that Ferrin would still be entitled to be paid by KRA even
if he were to quit KRA.
Ferrin further

contends

that Romney never

"alleg[ed] or

proffer[ed] that during the negotiations for sale of the business
the issue of the compensation of [Ferrin] arose."
-8-

In the first

place, that assertion is false. See, e.g., Transcript, Day 2, pp.
83 and 86. Secondly, it was plainly evident from the key portions
of the documents proffered and read to the court that they dealt
with "the issue of compensation," so it is immaterial in any event
whether Romney also alleged or proffered that they did.
Romneyfs sole purpose in offering these documents was to use
these buy-out documents in connection with his defense -- that the
oral compensation "agreement" alleged by Ferrin did not exist, that
Romney never agreed to it, nor would he agree to it, and that if
the tables were turned and Ferrin were the employer, even Ferrin
himself would not agree to what he was alleging Romney in essence
agreed to. Not only that, in the case of exhibit 58, there was an
actual representation by Ferrin, an admission of a party, through
his attorney who drafted the document, of what the compensation
agreement had been "to date," (just a few months prior to the date
Ferrin quit KRA), which was completely consistent with Romney1s
position

at

trial

and

directly

contrary

to

Ferrin!s

trial

testimony.
There can be no doubt that these documents (or at least the
quoted portions thereof) were "relevant."

They certainly had a

"tendency" to make the sole and key "fact of consequence to the
determination of the action [i.e., the existence of the alleged
oral agreement] more probable or less probable . . . "
-9-

The fact

that the proposed buyout, the context in which these documents
arose, was never

consummated

relevance to this action.

is of

no

consequence

to

their

The key provisions of these documents

are essentially statements against interest, even admissions on the
part of Ferrin.

Ferrin's recitation of "facts" supporting the

"irrelevancy" of these documents go to the weight the jury might
have afforded these documents, not their admissibility.

The

documents were plainly relevant and therefore admissible, and the
trial court erred and misapplied Utah R. Evid. 401 in concluding
otherwise.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE BASIS OF
UTAH R, EVID. 403 AND THEREFORE RULE 403 IS
INAPPLICABLE TO ANY ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL
In his brief, Ferrin next engages in some speculation about
what the trial court may have done had it found the subject
documents to be relevant.
point.

The trial court never reached that

Utah R. Evid. 403 deals with the exclusion of relevant

evidence.

The trial court never found the subject documents to be

relevant. Utah R. Evid. 403 was not considered by the trial court
nor addressed by either of the parties at trial. The inquiry never
got that far, and the issue cannot be raised now for the first time
on appeal.
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IV.
THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT ROMNEY«S
EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 INTO EVIDENCE AFFECTED THE
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL
The trial court's error in excluding Romney!s Exhibits 57 and
58

from

being

admitted

into

evidence

prejudiced

Romney

and

constitutes reversible error.

Without question, there is "a

reasonable

the

likelihood"

that

trial

court's

erroneous

determination affected the outcome of the proceedings.

Ferrin

contends that is not so, and in support thereof repeats the same
arguments he has already made concerning the fact that the proposed
buyout was never completed, etc., which objections merely go to the
weight of the evvidence, not their admissibility.
The single most important question considered by the jury -Did or would Romney ever agree to pay Ferrin as Ferrin alleges? - was addressed directly by these two documents. The trial court's
refusal to allow these documents into evidence destroyed Romney's
ability to defend himself from the allegations made by Ferrin and
to prove his case to the jury.
The fact is, these two documents, outside of Romney's own
testimony, comprised the only evidence Romney had to defend himself
from Ferrin's allegation that Romney had "agreed" to pay him a
share of income received by KRA, even if Ferrin were to voluntarily
quit KRA, as long as such income was "earned" by KRA before Ferrin
-11-

left.
else

Other than his own testimony, Romney did not have anything
to

defend

eviscerated

himself

Romney!s

with.

The

defense by

trial

refusing

court

absolutely

to admit these two

documents into evidence.
Picture it. The jury was presented with evidence that Romney
had received several hundred thousand dollars in income after
Ferrin quit KRA, that this money had supposedly been "earned" by
KRA before Ferrin voluntarily quit (which Romney denied, but it
fell on deaf ears), and here was Ferrin who argued in effect that
really as a matter of simple "fairness," and an implied oral
"agreement," he ought to receive a share of it since it had been
"earned" by KRA before he left.
What the jury did not see or hear was that, as evidenced by
Romneyfs exhibit 58, in Ferrin's own words through his attorney,
the "method of determination [of Ferrin1s compensation] used to
date

[the

"date"

being

just

two

months

prior

to

Ferrin's

departure!]" was completely different than what Ferrin was now
alleging at trial.

Contrary to what Ferrin alleged, the "method

of determination" was not based on whether KRA had "earned" any
income.

Rather, the true agreement was: "[u]ntil [Ferrin] . . .

is terminated, [Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received [not "earned"] by
KRA

. . ."

What is so remarkable and powerful about this
-12-

documentary evidence is that it was generated by Ferrin, not
Romney, yet it would have completely supported and proved Romney's
testimony at trial!
Not only that, the jury did not consider Romney's exhibit 57,
in Ferrin's own handwriting, which provided that in the event
Ferrin purchased KRA, Romney would be compensated for his efforts
"by receiving 20% of the income [not "earnings"] to KRA net of
[business

cultivation] expenses

. . ."

Moreover, and

more

importantly, "[i]f [Romney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated
the above mentioned

20% payments shall cease."

Ferrin's

at

contention

trial

was

that

his

compensation did not "cease" when he quit KRA.

Imagine it.

entitlement

to

His "fairness"

arguments would have been placed in an entirely different light by
this document.

If the tables were turned and Ferrin were the

employer, Ferrin was himself totally unwilling to agree to what he
so effectively argued to jury Romney impliedly "agreed" to, that
it just made sense, as a matter of simple "fairness" and equity,
that Ferrin should still be paid even after he quit KRA.

This

document shows that there is nothing "fair" about that if a party
has not agreed to it.
Ferrin did.

Again, Romney did not draft this document,

These are his words -- on the very subject matter of

the lawsuit! Yet they would have totally contradicted Ferrin's own
testimony at trial and supported and proved Romney's testimony.
-13-

Instead, all the jury could see or hear was Romney1 s stubborn,
and apparent self-interest and "greed" in not wanting to pay Ferrin
any part of the KRA income received after Ferrin quit and went to
work for a prospective KRA client.

Little wonder.

Romney never

agreed to pay Ferrin that money, nor would he have agreed to do so,
and these two documents absolutely would have borne him out on
that. . .

The jury was simply not provided with all of the

relevant evidence.

As a result, the outcome of the trial was

clearly affected, and this Court's confidence in the verdict should
be undermined to such an extent that it should grant Romney a new
trial where this key evidence will be considered by a jury.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
TAXING OF COSTS AGAINST ROMNEY
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs against
Romney because the witness travel expenses the court taxed as
"costs" are not authorized by statute.

In his brief, Ferrin

contends, in effect, that a trial court has the "discretion" to tax
witness travel expenses as "costs" even if such costs are not
authorized by statute.

In so arguing, Ferrin quotes from Morgan

v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), in which the
Court states that costs are "generally allowable only in the
amounts and in the manner provided by statute," but that a trial

-14-

court

can

"exercise

allowance of costs."

reasonable

discretion

in

regard

to the

Morgan, supra, at p. 686.

Ferrin has misread Morgan.

While a trial court may have

"discretion," there are limits to such discretion, and the limits
are set out in the statutes and the cases.

Indeed, the Morgan

Court itself went on to state that "witness fees, travel expenses,
and service of process expenses are chargeable only in accordance
with the fee schedule set by statute." Morgan, supra, at pp. 686687 (emphasis added).
The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) permits the
taxing of travel expenses at the rate of 25 cents per mile
"traveled inside the state in going only."

The witness travel

expenses taxed as "costs" in this case (airfare, lodging, taxi,
transportation, and food), however necessary or helpful to Ferrinfs
case, are simply not authorized by statute.

Consequently, under

the guidelines set forth by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court,
the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs against
Romney.
CONCLUSION
At the conclusion of Ferrin's brief, almost as an aside,
Ferrin makes the assertion that:
"the trial court did allow [Romney] to ask the witness,
for impeachment purposes, whether his understanding of
compensation was consistent with the language found in the
Exhibits. (R.1188.) [Romney] did not choose to follow the
-15-

Court's ruling in that regard. Accordingly, [Romney] should
not be allowed to complain, now, that he was prejudiced in
some manner.
This is a classic "red herring."
substance.

It is an objection of form over

In making his appeal, Romney challenges the trial

court's ruling, in the first instance, in finding these two
documents not to be relevant.

Romney also happens to believe that

the trial court acted improperly when it later foreclosed counsel
from effectively using these documents even for the limited purpose
of impeachment.

But the basis of this appeal is the trial court's

relevancy determination.
It is true that the trial court initially ruled as Ferrin
indicates. Transcript, Day 2, pp. 84 and 89. However, it is false
that Romney "did not choose to follow the Court's ruling in that
regard."

Even to the minimal extent allowed by the court, Romney

attempted to use these documents for impeachment, but was prevented
from doing so in any meaningful way.

As the transcript quite

clearly shows, Romney attempted to do so but was stopped in his
tracks by the court who, without any further discussion or allowing
any further questions, or even a side bar, reiterated her position
that

the

documents

were

irrelevant

and

sustained

counsel's

premature objections. Transcript, Day 2, pp. 103-105. Romney was
prevented from laying even the most minimal foundation for these
documents for impeachment purposes. He was prevented from putting
-16-

them in any sort of context at all for the jury.

This means that

the documents would have had no meaning to the jury and thus would
have

been

robbed

of

their

importance

and

value,

even

for

impeachment purposes.
The point

is, Romney!s

Exhibit

57

and

58 were

clearly

"relevant" in the first instance because they each had a "tendency
to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Moreover, the trial court's error
in excluding the evidence was prejudicial because there is "a
reasonable

likelihood

proceedings."

the error

affected

the outcome of the

Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding Ferrin's witness travel expenses as "costs" because the
"travel expenses" claimed are not authorized to be taxed as costs
by statute or under current Utah case law.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests
that the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
this case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

( / day of November, 1993.

David L. Blackner
Attorney for Appellant
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